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Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
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the right to appear and defend in person and by
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testify in his behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
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uniform operation.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1988) provides:
(1) A person commits theft if he receives,
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knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that
it probably has been stolen, or who conceals,
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling,
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880411-CA
Priority No. 2

GALEN L. JONAS,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Anne § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989) whereby a defendant in a district court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first
degree or capital felony.

In this case, the Honorable Jay E. Banks,

Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction against
Mr. Jonas for two counts of Theft by Receiving, a third degree
felony, and one count of Theft by Receiving, a class A misdemeanor.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Was there sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Jonas was
guilty of Theft by Receiving?
Was the failure to recuse Judge Banks reversible error?
Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in denying
Mr. Jonas' challenge of a juror for cause?

Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying
Mr, Jonas1 motion for mistrial after the bailiff improperly informed
the jurors on the last day of trial that another juror had been
excused and the reason for that excuse?
Should Mr. Jonas be given a new trial based on the
violation of his statutory and constitutional rights where an
inadequate transcript of proceedings was prepared?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Theft by Receiving, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Anne § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and § 76-6-412(b) (1978); Theft by
Receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-408 (Supp, 1989) and § 76-6-412(c) (1978); and Theft by
Receiving, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and § 76-6-412(b) (1978).

A jury found

Mr. Jonas guilty of the three counts after a trial held on April 20,
21, 22, and 25, 1988, (R.P. 159-62) in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Jonas was released from prison into a federal halfway
house in December, 1984 (Transcript of testimony of Barry Brown and
Galen Jonas, dated April 22, 1988, hereinafter "S.T.," 35-36, 60;
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Trial Transcript, hereinafter "T.," 268).!

He remained there until

the end of June, 1985 (T. 268; S.T. 60). While Mr. Jonas was still
in the halfway house, Jim Prater, a police informant, contacted
Mr. Jonas and offered to sell him drugs (T. 270; S.T. 38-40, 66).
This angered Mr. Jonas because although he had been involved in
criminal activities when he was younger, he had changed his
lifestyle and was trying to resume his life with his wife and
children (T. 270; S.T. 38).
Mr. Prater approached Mr. Jonas with another proposition
in early July, 1985, immediately upon Mr. Jonas1 release from the
halfway house (S.T. 40). He told Mr. Jonas that he, Mr. Prater, was
in trouble with the law and that he would do what he had to do to
get out of trouble (S.T. 41). Mr. Prater had already told a police
undercover agent, Sgt. Illsley, about Mr. Jonas and agreed to set up
some contact between Sgt. Illsley and Mr. Jonas (T. 161). In
exchange for police contact with Mr. Jonas, the County Attorney's

1 Not all of the transcripts requested in this case were
initially prepared. In addition, a hearing on Appellant's Motion to
Amend and Correct Record was held on July 6, 1989. The following
transcripts exist in this case and hereinafter will be referred to
as follows:
Three volumes of trial transcript,
April 19-22, 1988, numbered 1-309
"T."
Supplemental Transcript of testimony
of Barry Brown and Galen Jonas,
April 22, 1988, numbered 1-73
"S.T."
Transcript of jury selection/voir
dire, April 20, 1988
"J.T."
Transcript of April 25, 1988 prepared
by reporter who was not present
"T.R."
Transcript of Motion to Amend and
Correct Record, July 6, 1989
"T.M."

_

t

office dismissed charges against Mr. Prater and paid Mr. Prater cash
(T. 161).
Mr. Jonas decided to play along with the setup for two
reasons (S6T9 66). First, he felt that it was impossible to avoid
entanglement with the police once he had become their target (Id. ) .
He spent a lot of time trying to avoid contact with Sgt. Illsley but
was unable to do so because of the persistence of the police
(S.T. 67). For example, prior to one of the July transactions,
Sgt. Illsley contacted him by phone four or five times (S.T. 52).
Second, Mr. Jonas believed that he was not doing anything
wrong (S.T. 67). He knew that Mr. Prater was an informant and
communicated this knowledge to two undercover officers (T. 114, 145;
S.To 58, 66). Mr. Jonas knew the people offering him property were
police officers and recognized Sgt. Illsley as an officer who had
previously arrested him (S.T. 42, 61). Mr. Jonas communicated this
knowledge to a friend, Officer Barry Brown (S.T. 7 ) . Mr. Jonas also
knew that none of the property was stolen since Mr. Prater had told
him that the property the officers sold him would be either recently
purchased by the police or taken from evidence (S.T. 43, 58).
On July 17, 1985, Mr. Jonas purchased a television set
and a VCR from Sgt. Illsley (T. 77, 82-83).

Sgt. Roberts had

purchased both items for use in the sting operation (T. 23-24).
On July 25, 1985, Mr. Jonas purchased a television set
from Sgt. Illsley (T. 85, 93). In 1983, Detective Jim Crowley had
purchased the television set for use in another sting operation and
Sgt. Illsley took it from the West Valley City Police evidence room
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for use in the operation in the present case (T. 237-38).
On July 30, 1985, Mr. Jonas purchased a VCR and a video
camera from Sgt. Illsley (T. 95-96).

Sgt. Roberts had purchased the

VCR and camera for use in the transaction (T. 28-29).
Shortly after these events, sometime in the fall of 1985,
Mr. Jonas contacted his friend, police officer Barry Brown
(S.T. 55). He showed Officer Brown the property he had purchased,
which was still piled in his garage and asked the officer to check
through NCIC to see if any of the property was stolen (S.T. 11-21,
27, 56). The NCIC check showed that the property was not stolen
(S.T. 12).
In May or June of 1986, Mr. Jonas also had Officer Brown
accompany him to a meeting where Sgt. Illsley, acting in his
undercover capacity, was going to sell Mr. Jonas some drugs. The
deal never happened, but Officer Brown saw someone resembling
Sgt. Illsley driving away from the meeting place (S.T. 12-13).

If

Sgt. Illsley had tried to sell drugs to Mr. Jonas, Officer Brown was
to arrest Sgt. Illsley (Id.)
After the July, 1985 transactions, the police did not
contact Mr. Jonas again until March, 1986 (T. 99). Mr. Jonas was
charged with four additional counts of Theft by Receiving for
similar transactions during March, April and May of 1986.
Information, R. 26-27.)

(See

The jury acquitted Mr. Jonas of these

charges.
After arresting Mr. Jonas, the officers made no attempt
to search Mr. Jonas1 house or garage for any of the property

- 5 -

(T. 51, 71, 159) * Mr. Jonas had used his own money in purchasing
the property and had not involved anyone else (S.T. 59). He did not
sell the property to a fence (S.T. 46); instead, he took the
property home and left the bulk of it untouched in boxes in his
garage (Id.)

.

On April 19, 1988, Mr. Jonas made a motion to recuse
Judge Banks, who had been assigned to the case in place of Judge
Frederick on the first day of trial (T. 1). In 1964, Judge Banks
had been the District Attorney and had taken part in a hearing, the
outcome of which resulted in a dismissal of charges against
Mr. Jonas (T. 3). Mr. Jonas recalled that District Attorney Banks
was angry enough over the dismissal to attempt to suspend a police
officer, whose promise to Mr. Jonas had resulted in the dismissal of
charges (^d. ) . Judge Banks had also signed several other
Informations against Mr. Jonas during his tenure as District
Attorney (T. 4). The motion to recuse was denied (T. 14).
During voir dire, several jurors indicated they had been
victims of theft-related crimes.

Juror Number 6, Donna Smith,

indicated that she and her husband had been the victims of a theft
in which approximately thirteen thousand dollars worth of tools had
been stolen (J.T. 22). The theft occurred approximately a year and
a half prior to the proceedings in the instant case, and Juror Smith
indicated that the experience might interfere with her ability to be
fair (J.T. 22-3).

The trial judge attempted to rehabilitate her and

refused to remove her for cause (J.T. 22-23, 44, 48; T. 186-87).
Defense counsel was forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove
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her from the panel (R. 163),
The last day of trial was Monday, April 25, 1988. Over
the weekend during which the trial was in recess, a pregnant woman
had been shot and killed during a highly publicized robbery of a
video store.

Juror Davis was the brother of that woman and was

excused by the court at the juror's request (T.R. 26).
The bailiff, without authorization and outside the
presence of Mr* Jonas, his counsel or the court, informed the
remaining jurors that the court had excused Mr. Davis and told those
jurors the reason the court excused Mr. Davis (T.R. 5).
The specific details of the information the bailiff
conveyed to the jurors is not clear from the record.

See T.R. 1-6.

The court did not question the jurors to determine whether they had
been tainted.

Id.

Furthermore, the reporter who was present did

not prepare a transcript despite Appellant's repeated written and
oral requests, and another reporter, working from the notes of the
reporter who was present, attempted to prepare a transcript of the
proceedings held on April 25, 1988.
T.M. 1-18.

See generally T.R.; see also

Portions of that transcript are illegible.2
Upon conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted

Mr. Jonas of three counts of Theft by Receiving based on the
transactions which occurred in July, 1985 (R. 205, 209, 212). The
jury acquitted Mr. Jonas of the other four counts which were based
on transactions which occurred during March, April and May of 1986
(R. 217, 219, 223, 227).
2 The trial court held a hearing on July 6, 1989 in an
attempt to reconstruct the record. See discussion infra at p.30.
- 7 -

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
If a person knows or reasonably believes that the
property received pursuant to a Theft by Receiving charge is not
stolen, that person cannot be guilty of Theft by Receiving, since
neither a culpable mental state nor a prohibited act has occurred.
In the present case, there was insufficient evidence to establish
that Mr. Jonas had the requisite mental state.
Judge Banks committed prejudicial error when he refused
to recuse himself upon motion of Mr. Jonas.

Judge Banks had been a

prosecuting attorney involved in a case with Mr. Jonas twenty years
earlier, and Mr. Jonas recalled that then prosecutor Banks had been
upset over the outcome.
The trial judge abused his discretion in failing to
excuse Juror Smith for cause after she indicated that she had been a
victim of a crime similar to the crime charged and that she believed
such experience would interfere with her ability to be impartial.
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for
mistrial after the bailiff had unauthorized and improper contact
with the jurors.

By informing the remaining jurors that the trial

court had excused another juror and the reason for that excuse, the
bailiff interfered with Mr. Jonas' right to a trial by an impartial
jury.
The failure of the court reporter to provide an accurate
transcript of proceedings held on April 25, 1988 violated Mr. Jonas'
rights to appeal, due process and equal protection under the Utah
Constitution along with his statutory rights to appeal.

- 8 -

The

preparation of an inadequate and inaccurate transcript also violated
his federal right to due process.

ARGUMENT

POINT I. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE
THAT MR. JONAS IS GUILTY OF THEFT BY RECEIVING.
A. IF A PERSON KNOWS OR REASONABLY BELIEVES THE
PROPERTY RECEIVED IS NOT STOLEN, THAT PERSON
CANNOT BE GUILTY OF THEFT BY RECEIVING.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) reads in part that
[a] person commits theft if he receives, retains,
or disposes of the property of another knowing
that it has been stolen, or believing that it
probably has been stolen.
While the statute does not require the State to prove the property
received was actually stolen, it does require the State to prove
that the actor believed the property to be stolen.

State v. Pappas,

705 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Utah 1985).
The Pappas court explained this as resulting from modern
criminal jurisprudence's
very clear bias toward punishing an actor's intent
instead of simply punishing the manifest
criminality or outwardly criminal act.
In the theft by receiving statute the Legislature
expressed its desire to prohibit subjective
criminality (the culpable mental state of desiring
to receive stolen property) when it is accompanied
by an otherwise harmless act (receiving property
that is not actually stolen).
Id.
In this case, "an otherwise harmless act (receiving

- 9 -

property that is not actually stolen)," Xcl., is accompanied by the
nonculpable mental state of knowing that the property is not
actually stolen.

If there is "a legislative desire not to punish

manifestly criminal acts that are not accompanied by a subjective
mental state to do wrong," _Id. at 1172 (emphasis in the original),
there certainly can be no legislative desire to punish noncriminal
acts accompanied by a nonculpable mental state.

B. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT
MR. JONAS BELIEVED THE PROPERTY TO BE STOLEN.
w

It is fundamental that the State carries the burden of

proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense."
State v. Hilly 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986).
In applying this rule, . . . we have held that
where the only proof of material fact or one which
is a necessary element of defendant's guilt
consists of circumstantial evidence, such
circumstances must reasonably preclude every
reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence.
State v. Garcia, 355 P.2d 57, 59-60 (Utah 1960).

This is because

the existence of a reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily
raises a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.

Hill, 727 P.2d

at 222.
Mr. Jonas was convicted on three counts of Theft by
Receiving:
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by
receiving, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) the defendant received, retained, or disposed
of the property of another, (2) knowing that the
property had been stolen or believing that it
probably had been stolen, (3) with the purpose to
deprive the owner thereof.
- 10 -

Hill, 727 P.2d at 223, citing Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-408 (Supp.
1989).

Mr. Jonas' defense to the charges is that he knew that the

property was not stolen.
Mr. Jonas testified that in July, 1985, he talked to
Mr. Prater, who told Mr. Jonas about the sting operation, the
targeting of Mr. Jonas, and the undercover identity of Sgt. Illsley
(S.T. 41). Mr. Prater was absent from the jurisdiction at the time
of trial and therefore could neither refute nor corroborate this
evidence (T. 148-49).

The prosecution witnesses admitted that they

had no idea what Mr. Prater had told Mr. Jonas of their meetings
(To 68-70, 163-64).

However, Mr. Jonas1 wife, Annette Jonas,

testified that in July, 1985, she was part of a conversation between
herself, Prater and the defendant during which Prater told Mr. Jonas
about the "sting" operation but told him "not to worry about it,
that the merchandise was not stolen" (T. 277). Annette Jonas also
testified that her husband told her that he recognized Sgt. Illsley
as an officer who had arrested him in 1982 (T. 272). 3
Mr. Jonas1 reaction to this information from Mr. Prater
was to feel angry and uneasy (S.T. 41). He felt that it was unfair
for the police to hound him, and he was worried that they would
continue to harrass him.

His plan was to participate in the

operation, and somewhere along the line, find an opportunity to trip
up the police (Id.).

3

Sgt. Illsley testified that he had participated in the
arrest of Mr. Jonas in 1982.
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Officer Barry Brown testified that three times in June of
1986, Mr. Jonas asked him to check the serial numbers of the
property with the NCIC computer (S.T. 11). None of the property was
stolen, according to NCIC, and Officer Brown communicated this
information to Mr. Jonas (S.T. 12). After Mr. Jonas was arrested,
Officer Brown also talked to his superior, Lt. Vuyk, about Mr. Jonas
(S.T. 22). Additionally, sometime in May or June of 1986, Officer
Brown accompanied Mr. Jonas to a location where Sgt. Illsley was to
sell Mr. Jonas illegal drugs.

The purpose of Officer Brown's

presence was to arrest Sgt. Illsley.

The officer saw someone who

looked like Sgt. Illsley drive by, but that person did not stop to
pursue the transaction (S.T. 12-13, 70-72).
Mr. Jonas further testified that he knew the property he
purchased was either recently purchased or old evidence (S.T. 43,
58).

The State made no attempt to ascertain the final destination

of any of the property (T. 51, 71, 159); however, Mr. Jonas
testified that he never delivered any of the property to a fence
(S.T. 46). All of the property except one item remained in
Mr. Jonas' garage (S.T. 46). Although the police made no attempt to
search Mr. Jonas' house to locate any of the property (T. 51, 71,
159), Officer Brown testified that he saw a pile of boxed items in
Mr. Jonas' garage just before Mr. Jonas was arrested (S.T. 27).
The only evidence offered by the prosecution to establish
that Mr. Jonas believed the property was stolen came from
Sgt. Illsley, whose testimony was that he told Mr. Jonas the
property was stolen.

However, Mr. Jonas' testimony as corroborated
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by his wife and Officer Brown "negate[s] the required second element
of knowledge" or belief that the property was stolen.
P.2d at 223.

Hilly 727

"The state, therefore, had the burden of disproving

this explanation beyond a reasonable doubt* (Ijd.) . As in Hill,
there is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Mr. Jonas believed the property to be stolen.
In Hill, the Defendant's conviction for Theft by
Receiving was based on testimony that he had been in a burglarized
store the day before the burglary and was found in possession of
several of the missing items several days after the burglary.
Hill's defense was that he did not know the items were stolen but
rather had bought them from another person who, as it later turned
out, had actually committed the burglary.

The Court held that even

though there was suspicious evidence pointing to knowledge that the
goods were stolen, the evidence was insufficient to prove knowledge
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In State v. George, 481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971), the Utah
Supreme Court indicated that where the "possibility or even
probability" that a reasonable alternative hypothesis is true (Id.
at 667), it is "more conscionable if a guilty one might on occasion,
where proof is lacking, go free rather than gamble with the lives of
those who might be guiltless" (^d. at 668). In the present case, it
is more than possible, it is probable that Mr. Jonas knew the
property was not stolen; proof otherwise is lacking.
convictions for Theft by Receiving should be reversed.
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Therefore, his

POINT II. THE FAILURE TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE BANKS
WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-29 (c) and (d) (Supp. 1989) set
forth the applicable procedure for challenging the ability of a
trial judge to hear a particular case.

Those subsections provide:

(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any
criminal action or proceeding files an affidavit
that the judge before whom the action or proceeding
is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice,
either against the party or his attorney or in
favor of any opposing party to the suit, the judge
shall proceed no further until the challenge is
disposed of. Every affidavit shall state the facts
and the reasons for the belief that the bias or
prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon as
practicable after the case has been assigned or the
bias or prejudice is known. No affidavit may be
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of
counsel of record that the affidavit and
application are made in good faith.
(d) If the challenged judge questions the
sufficiency of the allegation of disqualification,
he shall enter an order directing that a copy be
forthwith certified to another named judge of the
same court or of a court of like jurisdiction,
which judge shall then pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the allegations. If the challenged
judge does not question the legal sufficiency of
the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the
affidavit is certified finds that it is legally
sufficient, another judge shall be called to try
the case or to conduct the proceeding. If the
judge to whom the affidavit is certified does not
find the affidavit to be legally sufficient, he
shall enter a finding to that effect and the
challenged judge shall proceed with the case or
proceeding.
In the present case, the judge who heard the case replaced
the previously assigned judge on the day of trial (T. 8, 116).
Immediately upon hearing of the change in judges, Mr. Jonas filed an
Affidavit of Prejudice (R. 122-125).

At a hearing held prior to the

commencement of the trial, Mr. Jonas testified that in 1964, Judge
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Banks had prosecuted a case against Mr. Jonas in which the State had
been forced to dismiss the charges based on a promise made by an
officer (T. 2-3). Then District Attorney Banks was irritated by the
resolution of the case and had wanted the officer suspended for his
actions (T. 3). Mr. Jonas also testified that then District
Attorney Banks had also prosecuted him on other matters (T. 3-4,
6-7, 8). Two of the convictions obtained while Judge Banks was
District Attorney formed the basis of the Habitual Criminal charge
(T. 9).
Judge Banks denied having any actual prejudice against
Mr. Jonas and found that sufficient legal grounds for disqualifying
himself did not exist (T. 14, R. 156). He referred the affidavit to
Judge Sawaya, who denied the motion and referred the case back to
Judge Banks for trial (T. 158).
In State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988), the
defendants filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Banks based on the
fact that twenty years earlier, in his role as District Attorney,
Judge Banks filed four Informations against one of the defendants
and appeared in court to accept a guilty plea from that same
defendant. JLd. at 103.

The Utah Supreme Court held that reversible

error had not occurred since the defendant had not established
actual bias or an abuse of discretion and the court had complied
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-29.

L3. at 1094-5.

In reaching its decision, the Neeley Court pointed out,
however, that "a judge should recuse himself when his 'impartiality1
might reasonably be questioned.

Utah Code of Judicial Conduct
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3(C)(1)(b) (1981)."

id. at 1094. While pointing out that

noncompliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct does not necessarily
mandate a new trial for a defendant, the Neeley Court also affirmed

thatt
In holding that the failure to recuse is not
reversible error in this case, we do not withdraw
from the stand this Court has taken on previous
occasions that the integrity of the judicial system
should be protected against any taint of suspicion
[citation omitted].
JTd.
Although the facts of the instant case are similar to
those in Neeley, there are significant differences which establish
that, despite Judge Banks1 denial of actual prejudice, he abused his
discretion in not removing himself from the case.
As District Attorney, Judge Banks was more intimately
involved in a specific case against Mr. Jonas than he had been in
the charges against Mr. Belt which are discussed in Neeley.

He did

more than merely file Informations and accept a guilty plea from
Mr. Jonas.

He was forced to dismiss charges based on a promise made

by a police officer and, as a result, became angry enough to want to
suspend the officer.

Hence, he was more involved in decision making

in Mr. Jonas1 case and had negative reactions to the outcome.

In

addition, he was involved in the prosecution of several other cases
against Mr. Jonas (T. 3 ) . The appearance of prejudice in this case
required that a different judge hear it.

Due to the extent of his

involvement in the earlier case and his anger at the resolution,
Judge Banks should not have heard this case and committed reversible
error by not recusing himself.

POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN DENYING MR. JONAS8 CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE,
Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
in pertinent part:
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or
more of the following grounds:
(14) That a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the cause,
or to either party, which will prevent him
from acting impartially and without prejudice
to the substantial rights of the party
challenging; but no person shall be
disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter
or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded
upon public rumor, statements in public
journals or common notoriety, if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that the
juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the
matter to be submitted to him.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused
in a criminal proceeding the right to a trial by an impartial jury.
In an effort to comply with this mandatory provision, the
legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18 (1982).

See State v.

Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981); State v, Brooks, 563 P.2d 799
(Utah 1977).

The Utah Supreme Court adopted the rule as Rule 18,

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court recognized that Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution guarantees an accused a fair trial by an impartial jury
and held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
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excuse for cause two jurors who had been victims of a burglary.

The

Court stated:
Whenever the voir dire evokes a strong
emotional response, there is posed a warning that
the juror may not have a mental attitude of
appropriate indifference to the party or cause
before the court . . . [B]ased on the juror's
expressed feelings, attitudes, and opinions, the
trial court must determine by a process of logic
and reason, based upon common experience, whether
the juror can stand in attitude of indifference
between the state and the accused.
Id. at 884.

In Brooks, the defendant was charged with Burglary and

the two potential jurors had been burglarized in the past and felt
bitter about their experiences.

Both stated that they could be fair

and impartial only after the judge questioned them several times on
the matter.

Their initial response to the questioning was that they

might not be able to be impartial.

The judge refused to remove the

two jurors for cause, and defense counsel was forced to use two
peremptory challenges.
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge abused his
discretion in failing to remove the jurors for cause and reversed
the case.

As the Court stated in State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475

(Utah 1987); citing Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884:

"When a prospective

juror expresses an attitude of bias, a later assertion by the juror
that he or she can render an impartial verdict cannot attenuate the
earlier expressions of bias."

Furthermore, the court pointed out in

Brooks that "the failure to excuse a juror for cause and thus to
compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the
juror was prejudicial (citations omitted)."
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Brooks, 631 P.2d at 883.

Under Brooksf once a prospective juror expresses a bias
regarding the casef the trial court must evaluate that bias in an
objective fashion and not merely seek to rehabilitate the juror so
as to get the juror to state that he can be impartial.

If the court

fails to probe into the matter sufficiently and relies on conclusory
statements of the prospective juror, there has been an abuse of
discretion creating prejudicial error.
765, 768 (Utah 1980).

State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d

In addition, if the court's inquiry does not

even go this far, but only elicits general and indefinite responses,
an abuse of discretion has also occurred.

State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d

22, 26-27 (Utah 1984); see also, State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473 (Utah
1987)*
When the judge initially asked whether any of the
potential jurors had been a victim of a theft, he intimated that he
did not approve of the question by prefacing it with the statement,
"I almost hate to ask this question, but I'm obligated to"
(J.T. 22). Juror Smith was the first juror to respond, and the
trial judge interrrupted her two attempts to explain the incident
and her feelings about it.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: Yes, my husband had
about $13,000 worth of tools stolen about a year
and a half ago which we have never —
THE COURT:
or action?

Did a criminal act result from that —

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: No, it was reported to
the police, which they didn't do anything about,
and we still have never gotten —
THE COURT:

They didnft find it?
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PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
to side)
THE COURT:

(shook head from side

How long ago was that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
half ago.

About a year and a

J.T. 22. The judge then asked Ms. Smith whether the experience
would interfere with her ability to sit as a juror, and she
responded that it might.
THE COURT: Keeping that incident in mind, as I
indicated, there are different parties involved,
but sometimes based on our experience we allow that
to interfere with our thinking.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It might be. If it
was tools, I might be a little influenced.
T. 22-3. The Court cut her off and stated:
Well, wait just a minute. Let me ask the questions
and you just answer the question.
Although the trial judge's tone is not ascertainable from the
record, the questions and statements themselves suggest that the
judge was irritated by the juror's response that she might be
influenced.

Given the awe and intimidation most people feel when

addressed by a judge, that irritation, coupled with the judge's
prior suggestion that he disapproved of the question, would make it
difficult for most potential jurors to be open and admit their
bias.

Nevertheless, when the trial judge attempted to rehabilitate

Juror Smith, she indicated that the experience would influence her
ability to serve as a juror.
THE COURT: Bearing in mind, do you believe that
that incident would make it difficult for you to be
fair and impartial, particularly to this Defendant,
as well as the people of the state of Utah?
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PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
say.

It's a little hard to

THE COURT: Well, you just take time to think it
over because we — you're the one that —
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:

It probably would, yes.

J.T. 23. The trial judge again attempted to rehabilitate Ms. Smith.
THE COURT:

Let's see. You're Mrs. —

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:

Smith, Donna Smith.

THE COURT: You don't believe that you could set
those facts aside and make a determination on the
evidence that's presented in this case?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: I —
believe I could be impartial.

well, yes, I

J.T. 23. At this point, the judge acknowledged that "[w]e know you
didn't like to lose the tools" (J.T. 23); Ms. Smith agreed, "No, I
didn't" (S.T. 23).
After the above exchange, the Court moved on to the next
juror and did not further question Juror Smith regarding the theft
or any bias or prejudice she might feel as a result of it. See
Addendum A for entire transcript of court's questioning of
prospective juror Smith.
Defense counsel challenged the juror for cause at the
bench and later placed his exception to the Court's failure to
excuse her on the record (J.T. 44, 48; T. 186-7).
The present case is similar to Brooks in that the juror
was a victim of a crime similar to the one charged.

The juror

indicated that as a result, it might be difficult to be fair and
impartial.

After repeated indications by the juror that she had
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concerns about her impartiality, the Court asked a single leading
question, to which the juror responded that she believed she could
be impartial.

After acknowledging that the juror did not like being

the victim of a theft, the Court dropped the subject and refused to
excuse her.
The exchange as a whole indicates that Juror Smith did not
believe she could be impartial.

The single response that she could

be impartial did not rehabilitate her as a juror and the trial judge
abused his discretion in failing to exclude her or to question her
further regarding her bias.

Under such circumstances, Mr, Jonas was

denied his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury under the
federal and state constitutions as well as his statutory right to
excuse jurors for cause.

Defense counsel was required to use a

peremptory challenge to remove Juror Smith from the panel and, as a
result, the matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial
(Re 163).

POINT IV: THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT MR. JONAS' MOTION FOR MISTRIAL.
On the last day of trial, Monday, April 25, 1988, juror
Davis informed the court that he could not continue as a juror due
to the fact that his pregnant sister had been murdered in a robbery
of a video store over the weekend (T.R. 2-3). 4

Prior to court being

called into session, the bailiff approached the remaining jurors and

4 The video store robbery and homicide had been highly
publicized during the two days prior to the last day of trial.
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told them

"that Mr. Davis wouldn't be in because his sister was the

lady that was shot out in West Valley* (T.R. 5).
Although the record of the last day of trial has not been
completely transcribed and a dispute exists between Appellant and
prosecuting attorney as to the specifics of what the bailiff said to
the jury, the trial judge, based on his memory, indicated that he
recalled that the bailiff told the jurors that Mr. Davis1 sister had
been murdered in the video store robbery and that Mr. Davis could no
longer serve because he could not concentrate due to the trauma of
that event (T.M. 3-4). The jurors had not been aware of Mr. Davis1
relationship to the victim in that highly publicized event prior to
the statement, nor were they discussing the case or the incident
when the bailiff spoke to them.

According to the bailiff, "[t]hey

didn't know anything about it" prior to his comments (T.R. 5).
Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee a
criminal defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury.

In

State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court
"reaffirm[ed] the proposition that a rebuttable presumption of
prejudice arises from any unauthorized contact during a trial
between witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors which
goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended and brief contact."

Id.

at 280; citing State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943); Glazier v.
Cram, 267 P. 188 (Utah 1928); and State v. Anderson, 237 P. 941
(Utah 1925).

The Pike Court noted:
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We have long taken a strict approach in assuring
that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial
not be compromised by improper contacts between
jurors and witnesses, attorneys or court personnel.
712 P.2d at 279.

The Pike Court held that such improper contact

raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, requiring the State to
establish that the improper contact did not influence the jury*
The possibility that improper contacts may
influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be
able to recognize and that a defendant may be left
with questions as to the impartiality of the jury,
leads to the conclusion that where the contact is
more than incidental, the burden is on the
prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact
did not influence the juror.
Idc

In Pike, a State witness and juror discussed the witness1 limp

which had been caused when the witness "bunged* his toe.
P*2d at 279.

Pike, 712

That conversation was more than brief or incidental

and raised a presumption of prejudice which was not rebutted.
Although Pike involved improper contact between a
prosecution witness and juror rather than court personnel and a
juror, the language employed in the case and the reasoning is just
as applicable where there is a possibility that a juror or jurors
have been tainted by the unauthorized statements or actions of court
personnel.

In Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), the United

States Supreme Court acknowledged that:
. . . the official character of the bailiff—as an
officer of the court as well as the State—beyond
question carries great weight with the jury . . .
385 U.S. at 365.
In State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987), the Utah

- 24 -

Supreme Court followed the approach set out in Pike, Although
Erickson also involved contact between a prosecution witness and a
juror, the Court again encompassed unauthorized contact between a
juror and court personnel in its holding "that prejudice will be
presumed from any contact between witnesses, attorneys or court
personnel and jurors that goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended
contact."

Erickson, 749 P.2d at 621 (emphasis added).

In Erickson,

a juror and a State witness had a four or five-minute conversation
during which the two discussed their families and the witness' job.
The Court determined that "[t]he conversation was more than a brief,
incidental contact where only remarks of civilty were exchanged!]"
(Id,) and that the presumption of prejudice raised by the conduct
had not been rebutted.
In Prudencio v. Gonzales, 727 P.2d 553 (New Mexico App.
1986), the Court pointed out that a "bailiff's duty is to attend the
court and jury" and that "[w]hen the bounds of that duty are
exceeded through the bailiff's conduct or comments, the question
arises as to whether the jury process has been irreparably harmed or
prejudiced [citations omitted]."

727 P.2d at 554.

By virtue of being a court official who has close
contact with the jury, a bailiff must guard his
comments and actions while in their presence. When
the bailiff's conduct invades or infringes upon the
jury's province, it is probable that prejudice will
occur [citation omitted].

In the present case, the exact nature of the bailiff's
comments to the jury regarding the release of Juror Davis is not
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clear both because of the illegible portions of the transcript,
which was prepared by a reporter who was not present during the
proceedings (see discussion infra at p.30), as well as the limited
discussion by only the bailiff as to what occurred.

The bailiff

stated:
I went in and I told them that Mr. Davis wouldn't
be in because his sister was the lady that was shot
out in West Valley.
(T.R. 5). The trial court did not question the jurors as to the
details of what the bailiff had told them or to ascertain whether
their impartiality had been affected by the bailiff's unauthorized
comments.
In Scott v. State, 448 P.2d 272 (Okl. Cr. 1968), the Court
noted that "from the record in this case, it is not made entirely
clear whether or not anything else was said between the bailiff and
the jury, other than with reference to coffee.

Such being the case,

the prejudice is presumed, and as I review the record that
presumption was not overcome."

I^d. at 275.

Similarly, in Pike, where the questioning of a witness was
brief and did not disclose the entire contents of the conversation
and there was "no other evidence as to the scope and subject matter
of the conversation since a transcript of the post-verdict
questioning of the juror has not been provided on . . . appeal," 712
P.2d at 280, the Court determined that from what was reported, a
presumption of prejudice had been raised which was not rebutted.
Hence, any uncertainty in the record as to the exact nature of the
statements made by the bailiff must work in favor of Mr. Jonas.
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Although there is disagreement as to the specifics of what
the bailiff said to the jurors in this case (see Affidavit of Galen
Jonas, Addendum F and Order Settling Record, Addendum G), the
information which is included in the transcript establishes that the
contact between the bailiff and the jurors was more than brief and
incidental and went beyond mere civilties.

At the very least, the

bailiff informed the jurors of the reason that another juror had
been excused.

He made them aware that the juror's sister had been

murdered in a highly publicized incident that had occurred over the
weekend.
The bailiff's action in informing the jurors of a reason
for excusing another juror was outside his role as a bailiff and
went beyond any permissible contact that might be allowed as part of
his duties in shepherding the jury.

The statement tended to

heighten the jurors' awareness of crime in the community and would
give rise to all of the reactions, fears and concerns that people
feel when considering society's current level of criminal activity.
The nature of the information was far more intense and of a more
prejudicial nature to a criminal defendant than a conversation about
a bunged toe or a witness' job.

In addition, any follow-up

commentary by the jurors or the bailiff concerning the specific
incident or crime in general, none of which was recorded but which
it is reasonable to assume occurred, could have a significant
prejudicial impact on a criminal defendant whose case was currently
being tried.
Information to the jurors regarding the reason for
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excusing Mr. Davis should have been carefully controlled.

Instead,

the bailiff imparted the information in a completely uncontrolled
situation where Mr. Jonas and his attorney had no opportunity to
hear what was said and no opportunity to have input or comment on
the information or to object to it being conveyed.
Because the bailiff is viewed by the jury as an extension
of the court and because his position is that of a court official,
his statements carry great weight.
at 365.

See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.

Furthermore, he has a responsibility to monitor and control

his actions and statements while in the presence of the jury so as
to not taint them.

Since the bailiff's contact with the jury as a

whole went beyond one of a brief and incidental nature, a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice was raised by his unauthorized comments.
The State did not rebut the presumption of prejudice in
this case. When defense counsel initially made his motion for
mistrial, the prosecutor briefly argued, apparently in an attempt to
establish a lack of prejudice, that the jurors had already been
discussing the matter before the bailiff approached them (T.R. 4 ) .
However, contrary to the prosecutor's argument, the bailiff
ultimately testified that the jurors had not been discussing the
matter when he entered the jury room and that they knew nothing
about it before he informed them (T.R. 5). In the hearing held on
July 6, 1989, the trial judge made a finding that the bailiff's
statement that the jurors knew nothing about the excusal of
Mr. Davis was accurate (T.M. 12 & 14, see Addendum G).
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Hence, the

jurors were unaware of the information before the bailiff entered
the jury room.
When defense counsel initially made his motion, the trial
judge summarily denied it without prejudice (T.R. 3). Thereafter,
the bailiff briefly testified.

The gist of the bailiff's testimony

was that he had given the information to the jurors and that they
had not been aware of it prior to his entry.

Everything about the

bailiff's testimony establishes that the jury may have been tainted
by the information and does nothing to overcome the presumption of
prejudice raised by the improper contact.

Following the bailiff's

testimony, the court apparently again denied the motion (T.R. 5).
The State offered no information to rebut the presumption
of prejudice in this case.

As previously pointed out, this is the

type of information that probably impacted emotionally on the
jurors.

Even without further commentary by the jurors or the

bailiff, given the highly publicized nature of the video store case,
it is likely that the jurors reacted emotionally to the information.
Furthermore, Mr. Jonas' recollection of the incident
raises an overwhelming concern that the jury was tainted in an
irreparable manner by the improper communication.

As set forth in

Point V infra, Mr. Jonas' recollection of the information conveyed
to the jurors went beyond that of the prosecuting attorney and
judge.

He recalled that the jurors were informed that Mr. Davis

felt he could not be fair because the perpetrator of the video store
homicide had a lengthy record, as did Mr. Jonas, and it would be
difficult for him to therefore sit on a criminal trial.
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(See

Addendum F.)

While trial counsel could not remember the details of

what the jury was told, he did recall that he was concerned about
the manner in which the information was conveyed to the jurors as
well as the content of the information.

If the statement to the

jury was as Mr. Jonas recalls, or if any of the commentary by the
bailiff or the jurors included concern about an ability to be fair
because of the level of criminal activity in the community or the
level of criminal activity by Mr. Jonas, or any sort of comparison
between Mr. Jonas and the perpetrator in the video store robbery,
the prejudicial nature of the bailiff's comments simply could not be
overcome.
In this case, where the bailiff conveyed unauthorized
information to the jurors, and the State failed to rebut the
presumption of prejudice raised by that contact, the matter should
be reversed and Mr. Jonas given a new trial.

POINT V. THE FAILURE OF THE COURT REPORTER TO
PREPARE AN ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
VIOLATED MR. JONAS' STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, REQUIRING REVERSAL.
For the purposes of trial, Mr. Jonas retained counsel to
represent him.

Following Mr. Jonas' conviction, trial counsel filed

a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 254) and Request for Transcript in
which he requested that a transcript of all of the proceedings in
the instant case be prepared (R. 252). Trial counsel also obtained
an Order requiring the State to pay the cost of transcribing the
proceedings, based on Mr. Jonas' indigent status while incarcerated,
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and withdrew as counsel upon the appointment of current counsel to
represent Mr. Jonas (R. 257-265).
Although reporter Anna Bennett was present for the
proceedings in this case on all other days of the trial, on
April 25, 1988, Tauni (Byrd) Lee, another reporter, was present for
the majority of the proceedings (R. 162). On that day, Appellant
argued at least one motion for mistrial based on the bailiff's
unauthorized contact with jurors (see Point IV, supra), the trial
court instructed the jurors, the parties gave closing arguments, and
the jury reached its verdict (R. 162).
Despite Appellant's request, the reporter who was present
did not transcribe the proceedings for April 25, 1988 (see
Addendum H).

After leaving her job, she apparently left the area.

Appellate counsel made repeated, unsuccessful attempts to locate her
and to obtain a transcription of the last day of trial (see Addenda
B, C, D ) .
On February 3, 1989, this Court issued an order giving
Appellant ten days in which to locate the missing court reporter
and, if unsuccessful, an additional twenty days in which to
reconstruct and submit the record (Addendum I).

On February 23,

1989, this Court issued an additional order giving Appellant up to
April 14, 1989 to locate the reporter or reconstruct the record
(Addendum J).

Based on the February 23 order, on April 14, 1989,

Appellant filed a Motion to Amend Record with Affidavits attached
(Addendum K ) .
In response to Appellant's motion, the State contacted
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Anna Bennett, the reporter who had transcribed the proceedings from
the other days of trial (Addendum L).

Ms. Bennett was able to

locate the notes of the missing reporter from April 25, 1988 and
attempted to transcribe them*
"illegible" sections.

The transcription contains several

See Addendum H.5

Appellant objected to the content of the transcript and on
June 2, 1989, filed a Notice with this Court that the transcript was
not adequate (see Addendum M).

On June 12, 1989, Appellant filed a

filed a Motion to Amend and Correct Record with four affidavits
attached (Addendum D; see also Affidavits, Addenda C-F).

The State

objected and on July 6, 1989, the trial judge held a hearing to
settle the record.
As set forth in Mr. Jonas' affidavit, Mr. Jonas recalled
that Mrc Davis' inability to serve as a juror stemmed in part from
the similarity between the criminal past of Mr. Jonas and that of
the perpetrator in the video store robbery in which his sister had
been killed over the weekend.

Mr. Jonas further recalled that the

bailiff conveyed this information to the jurors.

See Addendum F.

As set forth in trial counsel's affidavit, trial counsel
was unable to remember specific details of the case but did recall
making a motion for mistrial "based on some problem with a juror."
See Addendum E.

His major concern regarding that motion "was the

means and manner in which the information was conveyed, as well as

5

Reporter Bennett incorrectly dated the front of the
transcript as "April 25, 1989." The proceedings actually occurred
on April 25, 1988.
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what [he] conceived of as the prejudicial content.11

Addendum E.6

Furthermore, trial counsel believed that he may have made an
additional motion for mistrial based on some error made by the
prosecutor during his closing argument.
At the hearing to reconstruct the record, the prosecutor
took the position that all critical aspects of that day's
proceedings were included in the transcript which was prepared by
Anna Bennett (T.M. 11). The trial judge, based on his memory,
attempted to fill in the illegible portions of the transcript
(T.M. 3-5, 8, 11, 12-14, 15-16).

A. THE INADEQUATE TRANSCRIPT VIOLATES MR. JONAS1
RIGHT TO APPEAL AS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I,
SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution explicitly
guarantees, inter alia, that a criminal defendant shall have a
"right to appeal in all cases."

Utah Const., Art. I, § 12. See

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions at v.7

In State v. Tuttle,

713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that
this provision establishes that "the drafters of our constitution
considered the right to appeal essential to a fair criminal
proceeding."

_I<3. at 704.

The Court emphasized:

6 since appellate counsel did not represent Mr. Jonas at
trial, she had no input on the details of the missing proceedings.
7 The federal constitution does not explicitly provide for
a right to appeal criminal convictions. Instead, the constitutional
right to appeal is part of a criminal defendant's right to due
process under that constitution. See discussion infra at 41-2.
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Rights guaranteed by our state constitution are to
be carefully protected by the courts. We will not
permit them to be lightly forfeited.
Id.

The Court acknowledged that although federal rights to due

process and equal protection do not require reinstatement of an
appeal which was dismissed when the defendant escaped when that same
defendant is subsequently returned to custody, "the fundamental
nature of the right to appellate review" under the State
constitution offers greater protection and does require such
reinstatement.

J^d. at fn.l.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1982) codifies this right to
appeal.

In addition, various statutes and constitutional provisions

facilitate this fundamental right to appellate review.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (Supp. 1989) provides that an
indigent defendant be appointed counsel through "the taking of a
first appeal . . c"; Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-5 (Supp. 1989) requires
the governmental agency that prosecuted the defendant pay the costs
of preparing the transcripts for use on appeal.
The Court Reporters and Stenographers Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-56-1 et seq. (1987) outlines the procedure for the appointment
of qualified court reporters as well as the duties of such
reporters.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-2 (1987) requires a court

reporter to attend all sessions of court and to furnish "with
reasonable diligence" a transcript of the proceedings to an indigent
defendant "upon payment of the fees as provided."

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-56-8(1) (Supp. 1989) clarifies that an indigent defendant can
obtain an order of the court that the prosecuting agency pay the
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costs of the transcripts in lieu of payment of fees.

To ensure that

court proceedings are transcribed as requested, the legislature has
mandated that violation of the Act is a misdemeanor.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-56-19 (1987) .
Very little Utah case law exists which discusses the
effect of an inadequate or nonexistent transcript in a criminal
case.

In State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979), without stating

whether its decision was based on state or federal constitutional
grounds, the Utah Supreme Court held that failure to transcribe
closing arguments did not deprive a criminal defendant of his
constitutional right to appeal.

In reaching its decision, the Court

pointed out that arguments are often lengthy and spoken quickly,
that the trial court has the discretion to not have them recorded
pursuant to statute, and defense counsel is present and can place
objections as to any perceived irregularity in the record.
In State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 990 (Utah 1982) (per curiam),
the Court followed Gray with very little discussion and, again,
without clarifying whether the decision was based on state or
federal grounds.
Defendant contends that it was error not to have
required recordation of the argument of the
prosecutor to the jury. This assertion is without
substance since defendant and his counsel made no
request therefor and have pointed to no statements
claimed to have been prejudicial or beyond the
accepted scope and latitude accorded the process of
summation and comment. [Footnote omitted.]
Furthermore, the question of such transcription is
ordinarily the prerogative of the trial judge.
[Footnote omitted.]
Glenny, 656 P.2d at 992.
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A year after the decision in Glenny, the Utah Supreme
Court reversed a criminal conviction where the transcript of the
voir dire of the jury panel contained inaudible responses.

In

State v, Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), faulty recording
equipment in the circuit court had made it impossible to transcribe
the missing portions of the record.

The Court emphasized in its

decision that
When faced with claims that a juror's responses to
voir dire questions demonstrated actual bias, this
Court is not at liberty on appeal to assume what
those answers showed when they are totally absent
from the record and cannot be reconstructed by
agreement of the parties. [Footnote omitted.]
Id. at 44?8.

The Court held that "a new trial [was] required

because of [the Court's] inability to review the appellant's claims
about the voir dire on an inadequate record . . . ."

Ld. at 447.

In Taylor, the Court again did not clarify whether its decision was
based on state or federal grounds.
A number of older decisions from various states have held
that the defendant's right to appeal has been violated, requiring
reversal of the conviction, where the court reporter has not
prepared an adequate transcript.

See, e.g., Little v. State, 97

S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936); Brannan v. State, 132 S.W.2d 594
(Tex. Crim. App. 1939); Seliger v. State, 138 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1940); People v. Lomoso, 134 N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div.
1954); Gibbs v. State, 214 P.745 (Okl. Crim. App. 1923); People v.

8 in footnote 3, the Taylor Court pointed out that the
parties had attempted to prepare an "Agreed Statement of Record";
they had been unable to fill in the gaps by stipulation.
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DeWilkowska, 285 N.Y.S. 430 (App. Div. 1936).

Although most of

these cases are not clear as to whether the decision is based on
state statutory or constitutional grounds, or federal grounds, they
affirm the principle that where a criminal defendant, through no
fault of his own, is denied an adequate transcript of the
proceedings, the conviction must be reversed due to the inability of
the appellate court to review the proceedings.
In addition, a number of state courts have reversed
criminal convictions based on a state constitutional analysis where
portions of a transcript are missing.

In State v. Ford, 338 So.2d

107 (La. 1976), the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the defendant's
conviction where the court reporter recorded only a portion of the
trial.

The missing portion included the testimony of four

witnesses, the voir dire of the jury panel, and the prosecutor's
opening statement.

Appellate counsel did not represent the

defendant at trial and therefore "had no independent knowledge of
trial events except as revealed by the incomplete record."
108.

JEcL at

Relying on the "absolute right" to appeal a criminal

conviction under the Louisiana constitution, the Court stated:
[W]ithout a complete record from which a transcript
for appeal may be prepared, a defendant's right of
appellate review is rendered meaningless.
I_d. at 110.
In State v. Jones, 351 So.2d 1194 (La, 1977), the
Louisiana Supreme Court again relied on the state constitution in
reversing a conviction where a portion of the proceedings had not
been recorded.

In that case, the missing portion was the hearing on
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a motion for change of venue.

See also State v. Robinson, 387 So.2d

1143 (La. 1980); State v. Thetford, 445 So.2d 128 (La. Ct. App.
1984).
In State v. Perry, 401 N.W*2d 748 (Wis. 1987), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction where
portions of the transcript from two mornings of an eight-day trial
were missing based on the absolute right to an appeal under the
Wisconsin Constitution.

I_d. at 751.

The Court emphasized that for

the right to appeal to be meaningful, "a defendant [must] be
furnished a full transcript—or a functionally equivalent substitute
that, in a criminal case, beyond a reasonable doubt, portrays in a
way that is meaningful to the particular appeal exactly what
happened in the course of trial.

See also Commonwealth v.

Goldsmith, 304 A.2d 478 (Pa. 1973).

Although the Perry Court stated

that "not all deficiencies in the record nor all inaccuracies
require a new trial11 (^d. at 752), *[a]ny failure of the appellate
process which prevents a putative appellant from demonstrating
possible error constitutes a constitutional deprivation of the right
to appeal."

Id!, at 751.

The Perry Court, while not advocating a "per se" rule
where appellate counsel did not represent the defendant at trial,
focused on the disadvantages and handicaps to defendant and new
counsel where portions of the transcript are not available and
counsel was not present at trial.
New counsel is operating under serious
handicaps . . . Recollections and notes of trial
counsel . . .are apt to be faulty and incomplete.
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Frequently, issues simply cannot even be seen—-let
alone assessed--without reading an accurate
transcript.
Id. at 754, quoting B. Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate
Proceedings, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 783, 792-3 (1961).
The distinct language contained in Article I, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution guaranteeing a right to appeal criminal
convictions, along with the Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Tuttle giving greater protection under that provision than its
federal counterpart, establishes that the right to appeal a
conviction is fundamental to a criminal defendant in Utah.

A review

of Utah statutes directed at implementing this right along with
decisions from other jurisdictions establish that an accurate
transcript of proceedings is necessary for a meaningful appeal. See
generally Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964).
In the instant case, a complete and accurate transcript of
proceedings does not exist.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6 (1987)

provides that
A transcript of a reporter's notes, written in
longhand or typewritten, certified by him as being
a correct transcript of evidence and proceedings,
is prima facie a correct statement of such evidence
and proceedings! ]
However, in the present case, the reporter who transcribed the notes
did not certify them as being a correct transcript of the evidence
and proceedings, stating instead:
I have, at the request of the
office, transcribed the notes
reporter, TAUNI BYRD LEE, for
1988, which consists of pages
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Attorney General's
of a substitute
the date of April 25,
2 through 56,

inclusive. To the best of my ability, the notes
have been accurately transcribed.
(T.M. 57)

A comparison with her certification of the other portions

of the transcript reveals a significant difference as to her
"certification" of the accuracy of the transcript in dispute.
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License
No. 220, and one of the official court reporters of
the State of Utah; that on the 20th of April, 1988,
I attended the within matter and reported in
shorthand the proceedings had thereat; that later I
caused my said shorthand proceedings to be
transcribed into typewriting, and the foregoing
pages, numbered from 2 to 50, inclusive, constitute
a full, true and correct account of the Jury
Selection/Voir Dire, to the best of my ability.
(J.T. 51)

Hence, there is no prima facie evidence in this case that

the transcript is an accurate reflection of the proceedings.
Furthermore, it is clear from the transcript itself that "illegible"
portions are missing and, at the very least, the proceedings are
incorrectly dated.9
The trial judge's attempt to fill in the illegible
portions and his ultimate order do not give this transcript any
greater accuracy.

The trial occurred one year and four months prior

to the hearing on the Motion to Amend and Correct the Record.

As

trial counsel noted in his affidavit, remembering details regarding
a specific case more than thirty days later is extremely difficult;
along the same lines, reconstructing specific words in illegible
portions is nearly impossible.

In Felton v. State, 523 So.2d 775

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), the Court pointed out:

9 The proceedings at issue occurred on April 25, 1988, not
April 25, 1989 as labeled by the reporter.
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Reconstructions of an entire trial are relatively
rare due to the extreme difficulties in preparing
same; people's memories of a complex trial
involving many witnesses are rarely such that a
proper record can ever be reconstructed given the
passage of time,
Idk at 776.

See also Felton v. State, 534 So.2d 911 (Pla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1988) (reversing conviction after efforts at reconstruction
proved unsuccessful).
In Simmons v. State, 200 So.2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967), the Court also focused on the difficulty of reconstructing a
record after the passage of time.
. . . the greater length of time which has now
elapsed since the date of trial would have such a
dulling effect upon the ability of the trial judge
and trial counsel to recall with reasonable
certainty all of the pertinent facts which were
developed during the trial of this case as to
render a reconstruction of the trial in narrative
form unsatisfactory as a basis for fairly judging
the merits of this appeal.
Id. at 621.

In Simmons, eighteen months elapsed from the date of

the trial to the court's decision.
In footnote 3 in Hardy, the United States Supreme Court
recognized the difficulty of reconstructing a record:
Recollections and notes of trial counsel and of
others are apt to be faulty and incomplete.
Hardy, 375 U.S. at 280.

The trial judge's attempt to fill in the

blanks in the transcript based on his memory sixteen months later
does not adequately protect Mr. Jonas' right to appeal.
Furthermore, the fact that appellate counsel did not
represent Mr. Jonas at trial further prejudices Mr. Jonas since at
the hearing in which the judge attempted to fill in the blanks,
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appellate counsel was unable to give input to the judge as to the
details of what occurred on April 25, 1988.
In United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1977),
the Fifth Circuit pointed out that two rules have evolved in cases
involving the failure to comply with the Federal Court Reporter
Act.

Under the first rule, the defendant "must show that failure to

record and preserve the specific portion of the trial proceedings
visits a hardship upon him and prejudices his appeal."
1305 (citations omitted).

559 F.2d at

The second rule is applicable in cases

involving new counsel on appeal and requires reversal where a
substantial and significant portion of the record is missing,
without showing specific prejudice to the defendant or error.
F.2d at 1306.

559

Given the greater protections to an appellant under

the Utah Constitution, such a rule, where appellate counsel did not
represent Defendant at trial, should apply.

See also Hardy v.

United States, 375 U.S. 277, 280 (1964) (acknowledging hardships
faced by appellate counsel who did not represent a defendant at
trial) .
In the present case, although the missing day of the
proceedings was transcribed by a reporter who was not present, such
reporter was working from another reporterfs notes and unable to
make out numerous portions.

She was also unable to certify the

proceedings as reflecting what had occurred in court.
If this Court were to adopt the second rule in Selva,
Mr. Jonas' convictions must be reversed since a significant portion
of the proceedings, involving the details of a motion for mistrial
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after a bailiff improperly communicated with jurors, is missing.1°
This case is comparable to Taylor since portions of the record which
reflect directly on the impartiality of the jurors are missing.
Because Mr. Jonas remembers information of a highly prejudicial
nature being conveyed to the jurorsf the illegible portions of the
transcripts and questions regarding not only the accuracy of the
notes of the reporter who was present but also the accuracy of the
way in which the nonpresent reporter transcribed those notes leaves
a significant question as to what actually occurred in this case.
In deciding whether Mr. Jonas1 right to an impartial jury was
violated, as argued in Point IV, supra, this Court almost certainly
will look to the details of what transpired.

Without an accurate

transcript, this Court may not be able to fully analyze that issue.
The conditions under which this transcript was prepared
and the obvious missing portions make the accuracy of this
transcript highly suspect.

Mr. Jonas8 memory of what the bailiff

told the jurors was that Mr. Davis would be biased against Mr. Jonas
because both Mr. Jonas and the perpetrator of the video store
robbery had extensive records.

The illegible portions of pages 1

through 5 of the transcript of April 25, 1988 leave questions as to
what transpired and what was told the jurors; the trial judge's
order settling the record does not dispel those questions.
Under the circumstances of this case, Mr. Jonas1 right to

10 Furthermore, trial counsel believed he may have made an
additional motion for mistrial which is completely missing from the
transcripts.
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appeal under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution along
with his statutory rights to appeal and receive an accurate
transcript of proceedings were violated, and the matter should be
reversed for a new trial from which a complete and accurate
transcript can be prepared.

B. MR. JONAS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION WERE VIOLATED.
The fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution
guarantees Mr. Jonas due process and a fair trial.

Although the

right to appeal is not specifically stated in the federal
constitution, once the right to appeal is established by statute or
state constitution, it is included in the concept of due process of
laWo

See Reyes v. Delgado, 81 P.R.R. 906, 910 (1960); citing

Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 18, 19 (1956); Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U.S.
214, 215, 216 (1958) (per curiam); Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S.
206, 208, 210 (1951).

Hence, where a defendant's statutory or state

constitutional right to appeal is jeopardized, his federal due
process rights are also jeopardized.
In order to adequately pursue an appeal, appellate counsel
requires a complete and accurate transcript of the proceedings.
Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 (1964). n

11
grounds, its
is necessary
defendant is

See

Where appellate

Although Hardy was not decided on constitutional
determination that a complete and accurate transcript
for appellate counsel to adequately represent a
nevertheless applicable.

- 44 -

counsel is unable to review a complete and accurate transcript of
proceedings, an appellant's federal due process rights are violated.
In this case, where portions of the proceedings are not
included, and where the accuracy of the transcript as a reflection
of what occurred in court is uncertain, Mr. Jonas' federal due
process rights were violated.

C. MR. JONAS1 DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
RIGHTS UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WERE VIOLATED.
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
While recognizing that federal due process rights are not
implicated by the failure to reinstate a criminal appeal after an
escaped defendant has been returned to custody, the Utah Supreme
Court has nevertheless suggested that state due process rights may
be implicated in such a circumstance.

See Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 705.

Hence, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that in the context of
criminal appeals, the due process clause of the State constitution
may well offer greater protection than the federal due process
right.

Ij3., fn. 1; see Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 544-5

(1977) (Stewart, J. dissenting).
The nonexistence of an adequate transcript which appellate
counsel can review for error, both error challenged at trial and
"plain error," especially where appellate counsel did not represent
appellant at trial, so severely impedes the ability to appeal that a
defendant's state due process rights are violated.
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Furthermore, Mr. Jonas1 "equal protection" rights under
the Utah Constitution were violated.
State constitution provides:

Article I, Section 24 of the

"All laws of a general nature shall

have uniform application."
Although federal construction of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment may be persuasive in construing
Article I, Section 24,
[t]he different language of Article I, § 24, the
different constitutional contexts of the two
provisions, and different jurisprudential
considerations may lead to a different result in
applying equal protection principles under
Article I, § 24 than might be reached under federal
law.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984).

In Malan, the Court

pointed out that
Article I, § 24 protects against two types of
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to
all persons within a class. (Citations omitted.)
Second, the statutory classifications and the
different treatment given the classes must be based
on differences that have a tendency to further the
objectives of the statute. (Citations omitted.)
JEd.
In Tuttle, the Court noted that a defendant's "equal
protection" rights under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
constitution may be jeopardized where an escaped defendant's appeal
is not reinstated upon return to custody.

713 P.2d at 705.

footnote 1, the Court stated:
We recognize that a majority of the United States
Supreme Court has found that such dismissals and
refusals to reinstate do not deny federal rights to
due process or equal protection. Estelle v.
Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 95 S.Ct. 1173, 43 L.Ed.2d
377 (1975). However, that result appears based on
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In

the premise that legislatures can freely restrict
appeal rights because "there is no federal
constitutional right to state appellate review of
state criminal convictions." .Id. at 536, 95 S.Ct.
at 1175. The analytical approach presumably would
be different under our state analogue to the equal
protection clause, Article I, section 24, because
the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution,
unlike the federal Bill of Rights, does confer a
right to appeal on a criminal defendant. Cf.
Malan v. Lewis, Utah, 693 P.2d 661, 67-72 TT984)
(reviewing analysis of state equal protection
claims).
Id.

In Utah, a criminal defendant has both a statutory and

constitutional right to appeal his conviction.

In addition, he has

a right to have counsel represent him on appeal and to receive a
transcript of proceedings.
In cases where an adequate transcript for appeal was not
prepared, a criminal defendant is being treated differently than
others "similarly situated" and the laws are not being applied
uniformly.

In the instant case, where appellate counsel was not

present at trial and used a transcript with illegible portions which
did not contain information Appellant believed was conveyed to the
jury, the laws governing Mr. Jonas1 right to appeal were not
uniformly applied, thus denying him "equal protection" under
Article I, Section 24 as well as due process under Article I,
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant, Galen Jonas, requests that his convictions be
reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for dismissal or a
new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

Z 2 ^ day of September, 1989.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South
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Utah 84114 this
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ADDENDUM A

THE COURT:

I
2

All right.

I almost hate to ask this

question, but I'm obligated to.

3 victims of a theft?

Have any of you been the

And that, as I've indicated to you

4

before what a theft really is, taking property of another witlji

5

intent to permanently deprive them, or in receiving.

6 we'll take that first.

Well,

I saw some hands go up in the jury

7 box c
All right.

8

Mrs. Smith?

I assume all you women are

9 married unless you tell me otherwise.
10
11

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:

Yes, my husband had about

$13,000 worth of tools stolen about a year and a half ago

12 which we have never -13

THE COURT:

Did a criminal act result from that --

14 or action?
15

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:

No, it was reported to

16 the police, which they didn't do anything about, and we
17 still have never gotten -18

THE COURT:

19

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D, SMITH:

They didn't find it?
(shook head from side to

20 side)
21
22

THE COURT:

How long ago was that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:

About a year and a half

23 ago.
24

THE COURT:

Keeping that incident in mind, as I

25 indicated, there are different parties involved, but sometimed

22

t based on our experience we allow that to interfere with
2 our thinking.
3

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITHs

It might be* If it was

4 tools, I might be a little influenced.
5

THE COURT:

Well, wait just a minute.

Let me ask the

6 questions and you just answer the question.
7

PROSPECTIVE

8

THE COURT:

JUROR D. SMITH:

All right.

Bearing that in mind, do you believe that

9 that incident would make it difficult for you to be fair and
10 impartial, particularly to this Defendant, as v/ell as the
11 people of the state of Utah?
12

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:

13

THE COURT:

It's a little hard to say,

Well, you just take time to think it over

14 because we -- you're the one that -15
16
\7

18
19
20
21
22

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
THE COURT:

Let's see.

You're M r s . --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
THE COURT:

Smith, Donna Smith.

You don't believe that you

could set

those facts aside and make a determination on the evidence
that's presented in this case?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:

I -- well, yes, I believe

I could be impartial.

23

THE COURT:

24

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:

25

It probably would, yes.

THE COURT:

We know you didn't like to lose the tools.
No, I didn't.

All right, and M r s . Searles?

23

ADDENDUM B

F?L£lllB3',RKfi750«IR7
Third Judicial District

JUN 1 3 1989
SALT LAKE COUNTY

JOAN C. WATT, #3967
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

MOTION TO AMEND AND CORRECT
RECORD

:

v.

:

GALEN L. JONAS,

:

Case No. CR86-1609

:

HONORABLE JAY BANKS

Defendant/Appellant.

COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant, GALEN L. JONAS, by and
through counsel, JOAN C. WATT, and moves the Court pursuant to Rule
11(g) and (h) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals to amend or
correct the record to include the information contained in the four
attached affidavits as part of the record in the above-captioned
case.
This motion is made on the grounds that the substitute
Court Reporter who was present during the proceedings did not
prepare a transcript of the proceedings held on April 25, 1988.
According to the Court's minute entry at R. 162, the proceedings

held on April 25, 1988 included Defendant's motion for directed
verdict, at least one motion for mistrial, and closing arguments of
counsel*
Appellate counsel has made repeated efforts to locate the
Court Reporter without success.

At the request of the Attorney

General's office, a reporter who was not present during the
proceedings obtained the notes of the substitute reporter and
attempted to transcribe such notes0

However, relevant portions of

the notes were "illegible*8 and therefore not transcribed.

A copy of

the transcript prepared by the Court Reporter who was not present
during the proceedings is attached hereto0
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant, GALEN L«
JONAS, respectfully requests that the record in the above-captioned
case be corrected to include the information contained in the
attached affidavitse
DATED this

*?

day of June, 1989.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

- 2 -

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114 this / x ^ d a y of June, 1989.

T
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ADDENDUM C

JOAN C. WATT, #3967
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

AFFIDAVIT

:

Vo

:

GALEN L. JONAS,

:

Case No. CR86-1609

:

HONORABLE JAY BANKS

Defendant/Appellant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss:

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, EDWARD BARTON, being first duly sworn upon oath, do
hereby state the following facts are true and correct to the best of
my knowledge and belief:
1.

I am an Investigator for Salt Lake Legal Defender

Association.
2.

I have made the following attempts to locate Ms. Tauni

Lee, former Court Reporter for the Third Judicial District Court:
(a)

I ascertained that Ms. Lee's husband had been

arrested in October, 1987 and released through a bondsman.
The address on the booking sheet and the bond are
identical.

The reporter is not currently residing at that

address and appears to have resided at at least two other
addresses since then.
(b)

I spoke with the person who took the reporter's

husband out of jail.

That person was exonerated from the

bond when Mr. Lee was sentenced; he has not seen Mr. Lee
since then.
(c)

I appeared in the Third Judicial District Court

when Mr. Lee was scheduled to appear on an Order to Show
Cause.

The husband failed to appear and a bench warrant

was issued.
(d)

I talked with the other Court Reporters and

friends but have been unable to locate Ms. Lee.
DATED this /

day of June, 1989.

EDWARD^BARTON
Investigator

- 2 -

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

(

day of June,

1989.

mthki

PUBLKT

?

Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114 this

day of June, 1989.
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ADDENDUM D

JOAN C. WATT, #39 67
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

AFFIDAVIT

:

v.

:

GALEN L. JONAS,

:

Case No. CR86-1609

:

HONORABLE JAY BANKS

Defendant/Appellant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
)sst

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, KAY L. LAMOREAUX, being first duly sworn upon oath, do
hereby state the following facts are true and correct to the best of
my knowledge and belief:
1.

I am the Appellate Secretary for Salt Lake Legal

Defender Association.
2.

During the past several months, I have made repeated

attempts to locate Ms. Tauni Lee, former Court Reporter.

Our office

has cases in addition to the above-captioned case in which we have

had difficulty obtaining transcripts.

My attempts have included but

have not been limited to the following?
(a) On November 1, 1988, I telephoned Ms* Lee's
last known phone number.

It had been disconnected.

(b) On November 2, 1988, I spoke with Ron Gibson of
the Court Administration office.

He had spoken with

Ms. Lee that day and referred me to the Employment Security
office.

That office agreed to write Ms. Lee a note telling

her to contact us.
(c) On November 2, 1988, I also spoke with Susan
Clawson, Personnel Director of Court Administration, who
gave me the same disconnected phone number that I had
called on November 1, 1988.
(d) Ms. Lee called our office on November 4, 1988
and gave me a neighbor's phone number.
could reach her through that number.

She indicated we

She said she would

check court records for information regarding missing
transcripts and would call back within the week.
(e) When I did not hear from Ms. Lee, I called the
neighbor's number several times on November 8, 9 and 14,
1988.

I finally made contact on November 14, 1988, and the

neighbor told me Ms. Lee had moved.

- 2 -

(f)

Since November 14, 1988, I have contacted the

Court Administration office several times as well as the
Employment Security office.

Ms. Lee's whereabouts are

unknown.
(g)

On January 12, 1989, I contacted Ron Gibson of

Court Administration.

He indicated that Ms. Lee had

"dropped out of sight "

Mr. Gibson commented that the

Supreme Court is also pursuing preparation of transcripts
by Ms. Lee.

He told me that he would call if he located

her.
(h)

On April 11, 1989, Ron Gibson indicated that

the previous Friday he had informed Ed Barton of our office
of Ms. Lee's most recent address.
with her parents in California.

She is apparently living
I attempted to call her at

(707) 544-1120; the number had been disconnected.

I sent a

letter to 1578 Peterson Lane, Centerville, California 93657
by certified mail (return receipt requested), requesting
that Ms. Lee prepare the missing portion of the Jonas
transcript and contact us regarding other needed
transcripts.

The letter was returned by the postal

department marked "no such address."

- 3 -

DATED t h i s

\gJt

<3ay of J u n e ,

1989

LAMOREAUX
KUROL*
J
Appellate Secretary

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

/&r

day of June,

1989.

NOTARY PUBLIC''' f
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114 this

day of June, 1939.

ADDENDUM E

RONALD J. YENGICH #3580
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

AFFIDAVIT

:

v.

:

GALEN L. JONAS,

:

Case No. CR86-1609
Defendant/Appellant•

:

Judge J a y Banks

STATE OF UTAH

)
)sss
County of Salt Lake )
1. Ronald J. Yengich, being first duly sworn upon oath,
do hereby state the following facts are true and correct to the
best of my knowledge and belief:
L

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the

State of Utahe
2.

I represented Defendant/Appellant, Galen L. Jonas,

at trial in the Third Judicial District Court in the case of
State v. Jonas, Case No. 880411-CA, currently on appeal in the
Utah Court of Appeals.
3.

In my 14 years of practice, I have always found it

impossible to reconstruct a file or specific details of a case
after

approximately

30 days.

I rely on the

transcript of

hearings and the court file for appellate purposes and for any
other details I need to know.

The transcript is the best means I

Affidavit
State v. Jonas, Case No. CR86-1609
Page 2

am aware of to record specific details and words without relying
on generalities common to all trials,,
4.

I remember making a motion for mistrial in the

above case based on some problem with a juror,

I do not remember

the specifics of that motion or the specific information conveyed
to the jury.

However, I recall generally that my major concern

was the means and manner in which the information was conveyed,
as well as what I conceived of as the prejudicial content.
5.

I also vaguely recall making a motion for mistrial

based on the prosecutor's closing argument.
the details of that motion, but

I believe

I do not remember
it was made after

objection and outside the presence of the jury.
6.

I

have

reviewed

the

file

and

attempted

to

reconstruct the events of that trial, given the number of trials
I have had since that time.
7.

I have reviewed the transcript of proceedings which

were held on April 25, 1988, and which was prepared by a reporter
who was not present.

Significant portions of what transpired, in

particular, the specific details as to the information conveyed
by the bailiff to the jurors, appear to be missing from that
transcript.
DATED this

Q

day of June^, 1989•

£1

RONALD J. YENGI
Attorney at Law

Affidavit
State v. Jonas, Case No. CR86-1609
Page 3

•N
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this C "

June, 1989.

I

f

r

day of

J

NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
My Commission Expires:

^ /

mi
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was mailed/delivered to the Salt Lake County Attorney's
Office, 231 East Fourth South, Third Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84111; and a copy to the Office of the Attorney General, 236
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this
day of June, 1989.

ADDENDUM F

JOAN C. WATT, #3967
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

AFFIDAVIT

:

v,

:

GALEN L. JONAS,

:

Case No. CR86-1609

:

HONORABLE JAY BANKS

Defendant/Appellant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss:

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, GALEN L. JONAS, being first duly sworn upon oath, do
hereby state the following facts are true and correct to the best of
my knowledge and belief:
1.

I am the Defendant/Appellant in the case of State v.

Jonas, Case No. 880411-CA, in the Utah Court of Appeals.

rested.

2.

The trial in such case was held on April 19-25, 1988.

3.

On the afternoon of Friday, April 22, 1988, both sides

The court instructed the jurors and parties to return the

following Monday, April 25, 1988, for instructions and closing
arguments.
4.

On Monday, April 25, 1988, prior to the start of the

proceedings, Juror Number 7, John Davis, informed the bailiff that
he would be unable to proceed as a juror in the case and would have
to disqualify himself for prejudice.

He told the bailiff that his

sister, Anna Holmes, had been killed over the weekend in an
aggravated robbery of a video store.

The case, along with the

perpetrator's history of past crimes, had been highly publicized
over the weekend.

The juror told the bailiff that, as a result of

my criminal past and his reactions to the death of his sister and
the criminal past of the perpetrator in that case, he could not be
fair.
5.

Mr. Davis was excused from the jury.

The bailiff

informed the remaining jurors as to the basis for excusing
Mr. Davis, including the fact that Mr. Davis was the brother of the
pregnant woman who had been shot in the video store over the weekend
and felt that he could not be fair.
6.

The judge asked the bailiff why he conveyed the

information to the jurors.

The bailiff responded that he did so

because Mr. Davis asked him to let the jurors know why he was
excused.

The judge asked whether the jurors were already aware of

• 2 -

the information, and the bailiff responded that they were note
7.

A court reporter was present during the in-chambers

hearing during which defense counsel made a motion for mistrial as a
result of the jury being informed of the basis for excusing
Mr. Davis.
8.

I have reviewed the transcript of proceedings held on

April 25, 1988 which was prepared by a reporter who was not present
and which contains numerous illegible portions.

Significant

portions of the record are missing from that transcript, including
the information set forth above as to the specifics of what the
bailiff told the jurors.
DATED this

°f

day of June, 1989.

/vyOst xjf^AQwb

GALEN^rr.ATONAS
Defendant/Appellant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

°f

day of June,

1989c

My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
^
Residing in/salt^Lake County, Utah
\j

foC<^(W
- 3 -

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, otah 84111
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Otah 84114 this

day of June, 1989.
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ADDENDUM G

FILES SJST&STSOyST
Third Judicial District

AUG

JOAN C. WATT, #3967
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

1 1989

SALT LAKE COUNTY

By,

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER SETTLING AND APPROVING
RECORD

Plaintiff,
v.
GALEN L. JONAS,
Defendant.

Case No. CR86-1609
Court of Appeals 880411-CA
HONORABLE JAY E. BANKS

Based upon Defendant's Motion to Amend and Correct Record
and pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Court of Appeals,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the record be settled and
approved as follows:
1.

The information regarding the dismissal of Mr. Davis as

a juror which the bailiff conveyed to the remaining jurors was that
Mr, Davis1 sister had been killed in a robbery of a video store over
the weekend and the trauma of that event made it impossible for
Mr. Davis to continue serving on the jury because he could not
concentrate.

The "illegible" portion of page 2 of the transcript of

the April 25, 1988 hearing contained a statement to the effect that
the death of Mr. Davis1 sister in the robbery was so traumatic that

Mr. Davis could not continue as a juror because he could not devote
his attention to being a juror*
2.

The testimony by the bailiff, Hugh Bell, contained on

page 5 of the transcript of the April 25, 1988 hearing that the
jurors were not discussing the matter when he entered and did not
know a thing about the death of Mr. Davis' sister before the bailiff
told them is accurate.

The statement on page 3 by Mr. Verhoef which

contains the first "illegible11 portion on that page is incorrect
since Deputy Bell testified that the jurors were unaware of the
information.
3.

Defense counsel made a motion for mistrial based on the

bailiff's communication with the jurors.

The substance of defense

counsel's objection is contained in the transcript.
4.

The Court does not recall an objection or motion being

made by defense counsel during the prosecutor's closing argument or
after the jurors began deliberating.
DATED this

/ **~ day of J^rf^r, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE JAY E. BANKS

APPROVED AS TO FORM
I have read the foregoing Order, and it accurately reflects
the statements made by the trial judge during the hearing held on
July 6, 1989.
DATED this

^

day of July, 1989.

<jfc>-C.d£tt
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant

/^ANDRA L.
/ / Assistant^At^oiMey General

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and
the Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102, this

7'

day of July, 1989.

.^/

-
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JELIVEREu

/

AUG

1 1989

0

D. LOYOLA

ADDENDUM H

A p r i l 25, 1988

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

3
4

Record should show this proceeding taking

place out of the presence of the jury.

The Defendant is

5 present with counsel and the state's representative.
6

You may proceed.

7

MR. YENGICH:

I would move admission of Defense

8

Exhibits 27, 28, 29, which I forgot to move prior to the

9

closing of my case.

10

THE COURT:

So ordered.

11

MR. YENGICH:

Be sure and tell it to Joan.

Second thing is this morning, I think

12 the record ought to reflect that juror number six, I believe
13 Mr. Davis is his name, came in to chambers.
14

THE COURT:

Before any other jurors --

15

MR. YENGICH:

Outside of the presence of the jury.

16 Just -- only people present were counsel and the Court and
17 indicated that his sister was the lady that was brutally
18 shot in the head and killed at a convenience store or at a
19 video store robbery over the weekend.

The facts are that

20 she was shot and she was eight months pregnant at the time
21

and the baby was born.

He indicated that he did not feel,

22 under those circumstances, that he (illegible)

We stipulated that he would be excused from jury servic^

23
24

I was

told while we were going over jury instructions

25

that the Bailiff in this case had mentioned to the other

1

jurors that remained the reason for his being excused, i.e.,

2

that it was his sister that was the one that was killed.
The juror f s sister.

3 I

THE COURT:

4

MR. VERHOEF:

I think, in fairness to Mr. Bell, that

g J Mr. Bell indicated that the jurors were discussing it,
6 I apparently had (illegible) at least one of the jurors had
7

knowledge that that was the fact.
MR. YENGICH:

8

Well, anyway, he did inform them of that

9 J and that oay (illegible) how the Court is going to rule, we
10

may have to have a hearing on it, but my motion at this time

11

is, under those circumstances, for mistrial.
THE COURT:

12

Well, I did call Mr. Bell in and he said

that he had told the jurors -- what was the juror's name?

13
14

|

MR. VERHOEF:

16

|

THE COURT:

Davis.
Mr. Davis had been excused because of that

16 I reason, and you are making a motion for -17

MR. YENGICH:

18

THE COURT:

19

J

MR, YENGICH:
THE COURT:

21

I"11 deny it without prejudice.
Thanks, Judge.
Have you made a motion for directed

I verdict?

22 I
23

Mistrial

MR. YENGICH:
verdict.

I have made my motion for directed

I will renew it.

My motion for directed verdict

24 I is on the basis not only that I briefly argued, but that the
25

evidence shows that the Defendant knew the property was not

1

stolen an d that the mistake of fact or mistake of law issue

2

applies as we!ve argued in the jury instructions.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. YENGICH:

That motion is denied.
Also on the basis of entrapment as a

merit of law.

5
6

THE COURT:

7

MR. YENGICH:

8

Instructions bring them let them eat lunch.

9

THE COURT:

That motion is denied.
Thank you, Judge.

Depending on how long you take, might go

10

right on, let him make his (illegible) without a break

11

ve'll --

12

(Whereupon, Judge Banks placed Bailiff HUGH BELL

13

under oath, who testified as follows:)

14

THE COURT:

15

THE WITNESS:

16

THE COURT:

17

THE WITNESS: Yes.

18

THE COURT:

19

THE WITNESS: Yes.

20

THE COURT:

State your name.
Hugh Bell.

And you are Deputy Sheriff?

Bailiff of this court?

This morning at nine o'clock Mr. Davis

21

came in and stated reasons to the Court why he would like

22

to be excused from the case, and would you tell us the

23

sequence of events that happened after he left the chambers?
THE WITNESS:

24

He came into the courtroom and asked

for statement of service on his jury duty and I went to Joan,

25

I

4J

1

found where the statement was, got h e r t o f i l l one out f o r

2

him, gave t o him.

3

sympathy t o him and e v e r y t h i n g , and he asked me i f I would

4

t e l l t h e r e s t of t h e j u r o r s what happened, why he was

5

excused.

I walked t o t h e door and e x p r e s s e d my

6

THE COURT:

And what did you do?

7

THE WITNESS:

I went i n and I t o l d them t h a t Mr. Davis

8

w o u l d n ' t be i n b e c a u s e h i s s i s t e r was t h e lady t h a t was

9

s h o t out i n West V a l l e y .

10
11

THE COURT:

Were they d i s c u s s i n g the c a s e o r t h e

i n c i d e n t a t a l l when you went i n ?

12

THE WITNESS:

13

THE COURT:

14

THE WITNESS:

15

THE COURT: All right, you may cross-examine.

16

MR. YENGICH:

17

(Illegible) thing that what was said by the Bailiff in

18

his defense was intended to have affected the outcome of the

19

trial I know, you know to be (illegible)

20

record, notwithstanding that I would renew my motion which

21

the Court, which has been denied.

22

the record.

Did you ever hear them discuss it?

23

MR. VERHOEF:

24

THE COURT:

25

No.

They didn't know a thing about it.

No cross-examination.

I want that on the

Renew it on the basis of

No cross-examination.

The record nay show that all jurors,

except Mr. Davis, are present.

The Defendant is present with

j

counsel, and state is represented,

2

Mr. Davis, number seven juror, has been excused

3

because of personal problems this morning, and so, Mr.

4

Naughton, you move into Mr. Davis gs seat, and Mr. Smith in

§

number eight.

6

MR. YENGICH:

7

THE COURT:

Mr. Naughton, you were an alternate before.

iicvi you are a full member of the jury and will go in and

8

9

So stipulated, your Honor.

J participate in the deliberations with the jury.

10

JUROR NAUGHTON:

11

THE COURT:

12

getting started.

13

as was anticipated.

14

have the case argued to you.

15

late, but if it is agreeable with you, we'll have lunch

16

I understand, sir.

There is another matter.

We're late

These instructions took a lot longer, not
We can go through and instruct you and
It will throw your lunch

I sent into the jury room with you after you retire, and is

17

that agreeable to all members of the jury?

^8 I have to eat at certain times.
19

Sometimes jurors

Is that agreeable?

That is the way we'll handle it.

It will throw lunch

20

as late as an hour or so, but I think we'll save time in

21

the long run.

22 I

(Whereupon, Judge Banks read the jury instructions,

23

which were not reportea or transcribed.)

24

THE COURT:

25

I might mention here some of these

instructions refer to singular but apply it as it actually

ADDENDUM I

FILED

ft
$

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Nc-onan
»>* Court
Utah Court of Appeals

ooOoo

State of Utah,

ORDER

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Court of Appeals No* 880411-CA

Galen Le Jonas,
Defendant and Appellant•

This matter is before the Court upon appellant's Motion
For Extension Of Time For Preparation Of Appellant's Brief,
filed 31 January 1989.
It is hereby ORDERED that appellant is given an
extension of time up to and including 10 days from the date of
this Order to locate the court reporter and so notify, in
writing, the Court. If appellant is unsuccessful in locating
the reporter, appellant is given an additional 20 days to
reconstruct the record and submit the same, pursuant to Rule 11
of the Utah Court of Appeals.
Dated this

£&

day of February 1989.

BY THE COURT:

Judge Russell W. Bench

ADDENDUM

J

FIL
IN THF UTAH COUNT i)V APPEALS

FEB 2iW989

--—00O00Waft-Court or Appeals

f Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiiri and Respondent
Court: of Appeals No

880411-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the Coin: t upon appel lant' s
Request For Extension Of Time In Which fo Locate Cc^rt
Reporter, filed 13 Februar y 1989.

It is hereby ORDERED
K* ;

that appellant is granted an addition*! 30 days
and Including 25 March 1989 # in which to locate

ft

reporter, and so notify, in writing, the Court
further extensions to locate the court repo r f e*
be gran,ted,
in trie e w *t
repoi ter #

> n-

: r ,

->^*^» , . ^iit • - . ,<:>** **- *., , - .-»t ^ . )c

^uthei

ORDERED that appellant, is c ven

an additions. ^0 days, up to and including 14 April
1989, to reconstruct
pi irsi lant *'• ' ^ H P M

Dated this J 2 ? ^ d a y

the record and submit the same,
^f' * K ^ ?lf v** ~-^-r* ** *>--r^**-

I h-lir *i i y 1«"I89.

Judge Russell W. Bench

ADDENDUM K

JOAN C. «~*;', 13967
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF I I'll "UI
THK fl'TATF; 'Op" l!T

:

Plaintiff/Respondent •

MOTION TO AMEND RECORD

:

v,

:

GALEN L, J'ONAS,

•

a**-- No. CHb6-i6P9

Defendant/Appellant.

>N J R A B L E J A Y B A N ^

COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant* GALEN t

-^

^ *nd

t h r o u q h c o u n s e t l(l . 10 h H i , w i T1 •,,
I I I q ) o t t h e R u J e s of t h e U t a h u » u f

c» a p p e a l s r- i n c l u d e trse t o u r

attached affidavits as part of the recoid j.n the above-captioned
case,
• This motion *- -s-V v the grounds t-hat the Court Reporter
die m t prepare a t: » ^ n«? ^ r

* -1 *"v*e "*» r -e^Airt-:^

h^'"'
•

p r o c e e d i n g s 'it-.-, un April
d i r e c t e d — i- •
: ; ••

-

-r

uunsei.

.->

<* — • ^claded

i.eaSu one motion for

-•

I '"

D e f e n d a n t ' s motion for
-sirig

Appellate counsel has made repeated efforts to locate the
Court Reporter without success.

The Court of Appeals has ordered

that counsel attempt to amend the record no later than April 14,
1989e
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant, GALEN L.
JONAS, respectfully requests that the attached affidavits be
included in the record in the above-captioned case.
DATED this

/*/ day of April, 1989.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114 this

/</

day of April, 1989.

ADDENDUM

) !: V
THK ATTORNEY GKXI vR A i.
S T A I V (>l I "I \ l l
H

}>M

! \A\

i•\ M

A"> TOW(Mf v OiE ssf HAL.

DAVID \ . THOMAS

ASSOCIATE SE=> J T * A T T Q a s E v G£'.E = i .
I AH! r

l>oHH"S. ( n i l r

I.INDA l . U N S T K A .
I ' M l> C. \ K I . S o Y

April

20 f

"189

S T K I M I K \ (.. S C I f W ' K M J l M A Y < H I K K
Ta* & Business =*eg„.at.o- S . s s~
STKI'HKN -J. S O W - : \ S O V C ' H I K I •

('mil

MIC H A L ! . !J SMITH, ( ' H I M

I'IIIIT

Anna Bennett, C.S.R.
Third Judicial District Court
230 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 1 1
State \

Galen S. Jonas, Di st. Ct. No. CR 86-1609
Ct. of App. No. 880411-Ca

Dear .Ms Ben nett i
As I advised you by telephone on April 19, 1989, the
State requests you to prepare, from Tauni Lee's notes,
transcripts of the hearings at which she served as court reporter
in this case. Upon completion of the transcripts, please certify
them and transmit them to the District Court Clerk so that they
may be certified as part of the appellate record,
Please bill this nlJue lm pieparation of the
transcripts. Thank you.
Sincerely,

SANDRA
JOGREN
As sistant Attorney Genera ]
Criminal Appeals Section Chief
SLSsbks
ccs

Joan Watt

ADDENDUM M

Fll
PCC.'t-r G f . ^ Court
Utan Court o; Appeals

IIIMI trtHh ICJiJKT UF APPEALS DP THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

•

N O T I C E T H A T TRANSCRIPT IS
NOT ADEQUATE FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW

Plaintiff/Respondent!

GALEN

J ?NA<2..

"as^ No. 380411-CA

D e f e n d a n t 'iDpellar.t
Pursuant- 19 8 9 , *.• •- : -' * s

:

:
.--•--.-

:

* A D O ^ a l s d i \- i m n i
i

. -, i

;.-k- ••

a r*o •. , r wu9r* - vu.'iiti ^

JOAt< '. W J *. hereby n o t i f i e s -r.f-- Court that the transcr;c*
by A N N - v

B E N N E T T from h,-. •• *-•-.

LKK fci .

, 1 ' ^ v,, ,vt , . .

a b o v e - c a p t loned r a s e ,

p-^pa^ed

,t •

u;vd, •. rie lci^L Jay

is n o t a d e q u a t e f >r p u r p o s e s

>l ,

1
tria. ; 1 m e
*~ -appeuju.

A s r - ;-.
ut:iendant/Appellant shall a t t e m p t to reconstruct tne rec r- pursuant
-• / u l e :., R u l e s oi the Utah C o u r t of A p p e a l s (19o/; u ,
1989 «
D A T E D this

/

d a y of J u n e , ' 9 8 9 .

JOAN C . WATT

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Dtah 34114 this
of June, 1989.

- 2 -

^^

day

